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ARGUMENT 
1. Bray and Harrison do not possess qualified immunity from Appellant's 
constitutional -based claims. 
In addressing the legal issue of qualified immunity in their Brief, Appellees first 
analyze Appellant's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for violation of his First Amendment rights. 
Appellees present two principal arguments in support of their position that the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment in their favor and against Appellant, namely: (1) It was 
not clearly established in 2007 that a volunteer is entitled to First Amendment protection 
because mere dicta is insufficient to create a "clearly established right", and (2) even if 
volunteers do enjoy such first amendment protection, Bray and Harrison are still entitled to 
qualified immunity because Appellant's speech does not meet the four-prong standard set 
forth in Pickering v. Bd o/Educ, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). [Brief of 
Appellees, pp. 22-33]. 
Appellees next address whether the trial court correctly ruled that Bray and Harrison 
are entitled to qualified immunity from Appellant's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for violation of his 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. Appellees argue three separate grounds in 
favor of affirmation of the trial court's decision: (1) Appellant's equal protection claim is 
derivative of his First Amendment claim, (2) Appellant did not show by admissible evidence 
that he was treated substantially differently from other similarly situated coaches, and 
(3)Appellant did not show that there was no rational basis for the alleged disparate 
treatment. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 33-36]. 
Appellant will first respond to the arguments arising out of his First Amendment 
claim and then address those related to his Fourteenth Amendment claims. 
1 
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A. The right of a volunteer to protected free speech was clearly established 
in 2007 and Appellant's speech does meet the four-prong Pickering 
standard. 
i. The Anderson court clearly established that volunteers are entitled to 
Pickering protection. 
Appellant agrees with Appellees recitation of the general case law concerning the 
doctrine of qualified immunity, the standard required of a plaintiff who disputes qualified 
immunity protection, and the requirement that a plaintiff must also meet the second burden 
of demonstrating that the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the 
time of the offending action in question. Also, Appellant does not dispute that courts have 
discretion in determining which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should 
be considered first (i.e. whether a plaintiffs facts articulates violation of a constitutional right 
or whether the claimed constitutional right was "clearly established" at the time of the 
alleged violation). [Brief of Appellees, pp. 20-21]. 
However, Appellant disagrees with Appellees' contention that Anderson v. McCotter, 
100 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 1996) does not clearly establish a volunteer' first amendment right for 
qualified immunity purposes. Appellant maintains that the Anderson court unequivocally 
pronounced that non-paid volunteers are entitled to First Amendment protection under 
Pickering, Id at 727. [Brief of Appellant, pp. 24-27]. 
While he Anderson court did state that "[w]e need not to decide whether it was clearly 
established before this case that volunteers had Pickering protection, because Ms. Anderson 
was not a volunteer." (Italics added). Id. at 729, the court was merely announcing that 
because Ms. Anderson was not a volunteer, it need not look at whether early cases had 
2 
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established a volunteer's right to such protection.1 This statement does nothing to counter the 
fact that Anderson court announced that the Tenth Circuit does, in fact, believe that volunteers 
are entitled to First Amendment protection as a matter of law under dickering. 
Appellant cites multiple cases in an attempt to argue that the Anderson court's express 
acknowledgment that volunteers have a protected interest in First Amendment free speech is 
mere dicta. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 23-24]. Appellees' citation to Hope v. Pe/^er, 536, U.S. 
730, 762,122 S. Ct. 2508, 2527, 153 :. L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) is not helpful because the United 
States Supreme Court's statement in that matter had to do with reliance by one court on 
another court's dicta for purposes of establishing the unconstitutionality of the conduct at 
issue in that case. [Brief of Appellees, p. 24]. In the instant case, Appellant has not cited to a 
"different court," but has cited direcdy to a decision by the Tenth Circuit on the issue of 
whether a volunteer has a "clearly established" protectable interest in free speech under the 
First Amendment. 
Appellees only reference three other federal cases—two from the Eleventh Circuit 
and one from a federal district court in Pennsylvania—that dicta should not be relied upon 
in qualified immunity cases. [Brief of Appellees, p. 24]. Appellees admit that several circuit 
courts have found that dicta concerning the existence of a constitutional right can be relied 
1
 At some juncture, courts considering whether a constitutional right has been "clearly 
established" may determine that such a right has been established even if no prior explicit 
authority exists for such a determination. In other words, the clear pronouncement of such a 
right by a court may rest upon application of other cases through inference and 
extrapolation. See e.g. Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129,1136 (9th Or. 1992) (holding that 
volunteer status is a valuable governmental benefit or privilege that may not be denied on 
the basis of constitutionally protected speech); cert denied, 508 U.S. 908, 113 S.Ct 2337, 
124 L.Ed.2d 248 (1993); Janusaitis v. Middlebury VolunteerFire Dep% 607 F.2d 17, 25 (2d Or. 
1979) (holding that the dismissal of a volunteer firefighter for complaining about low morale 
and inadequate draining and discipline can violate the First Amendment)). 
3 
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upon as precedent to establish that right. [Brief of Appellees, p. 25 (n. 1)] but argue that the 
Tenth Circuit has not adopted such a standard. Even if such a standard has not been 
adopted by the Tenth Circuit, Appellees have not cited any case law from the Tenth Circuit 
that supports their own position concerning the limited value of dicta in qualified immunity 
cases. 
In sum, two questions must be answered in order for this Court to determine 
whether the clear and unambiguous statement by the Anderson court that volunteers are 
entitled to Pickering protection may be relied upon by Appellant to meet the "clearly 
established" prong: (1) whether the statement is dicta, and (2) if the statement is dicta, 
whether it should be excluded under Tenth Circuit case law for purposes of clearly 
establishing a constitutional right. 
Appellant asserts that the Anderson court's statement is not dicta. In Rohrbaugh v. 
Celotex Corp., 53 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir.1995), the Tenth Circuit indicated that dicta are 
"statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition 
not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand." Id. at 1184. It is 
clear that the Anderson opinion focuses considerable attention on the question of whether 
volunteers are entitled to First Amendment protection (despite the fact that the court 
ultimately determined that Ms. Anderson was not a volunteer). The Anderson court's 
statement that volunteers are entitled to Pickering protection was made in the context of the 
court's broad affirmation of the constitutional right to free speech. Anderson, 100 F.3d at 
726-27. It was essential to the court's analysis to discuss and decide Ms. Anderson's actual 
status (i.e. volunteer vs. paid intern) because the defendants in that case had argued that Ms. 
Anderson was a volunteer, and thus not afforded First Amendment free speech protection. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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In other words, the statement that volunteers have Pickering protection was "involved with" 
and "essential to the determination of the case at hand." 
Even if this Court finds that the Anderson court's statement concerning volunteers is 
dicta, the statement should not be excluded for purposes of determining the "clearly 
established" prong of qualified immunity analysis. As previously mentioned, the statement 
itself is "lucid and unambiguous" and was made to emphasize the Tenth Circuit's overall 
view of the importance of First Amendment free speech. 
For these reasons, this Court should determine that Anderson case "clearly 
established" the constitutional right of volunteers to First Amendment protection. 
H. Appellant has established the four elements of the Pickering test. 
Appellees correctly outline the four-step analysis set forth in Pickering and Connick v, 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138,103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Those steps are: (1) determining 
whether the speech touches on matter of public concern, (2) balancing the employee's 
interest as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern against the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service it performs through 
its employees, (3) assuming the balance of establishing the first two steps tips in favor of the 
employee, the plaintiff has to prove that the protected speech was a motivating factor in the 
detrimental employment decision, and (4) if the plaintiff makes the required showing under 
step three, the burden shifts to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it would have reached the same decision in the absence of the protected activity. [Brief 
of Appellees, pp. 25-26]. 
Under the first Pickering element, Appellees posit that Appellant's speech was not 
related to a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community insofar as it related 
5 
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only to a small group of players involved in Lehi City's sport's league and because the speech 
was "internal to the workplace." [Brief of Appellees, pp. 27-28]. Appellant counters that the 
speech did concern the community insofar as participating children and their families were 
potentially affected by the rule change that Appellant spoke out on, which rule change 
affected the welfare of the participants. 
The threshold question in assessing the free speech claim of a discharged, demoted, 
or suspended government employee is whether the employee has spoken "as a citizen upon 
matters of public concern" or merely "as an employee upon matters only of personal 
interest." Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. Speech regarding matters of mere personal interest is not 
subject to protection under the First Amendment. 
Determining whether speech involves a matter of public concern entails an inquiry 
into the "content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. Furthermore, some inaccuracy in the content of the speech must 
be tolerated. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-72. 
Appellant has identified five incidents of speech at issue. These include: the Pinto 
league draft, the Pinto league state tournament and the issue of whether the regular season 
winner would get an automatic bid, the over pitching rule, the petition to change the league 
rules for how the draft is conducted and the tournament player selected, and talking to Bray 
about his altercation with another coach over whether a player was a "slow runner." If some 
part of the communication addresses an issue of public concern, the First Amendment's 
protections are triggered even though other aspects of the communication do not qualify as 
a public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. 
The five incidents of speech at issue are grounded on safety issues as well as bringing 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to light areas in the little league program that he felt could be more efficiendy run such as 
fairness. Appellant had an expectation of fairness and expected everyone to play the rules, 
including city officials. Appellant was voicing his concern on the Pinto league draft and the 
issue of automatic bids because these rules appeared to have been changed mid-season and 
thus there was the appearance of arbitrary and unfounded decisions made by Blythe and 
Harrison reasonably raising suspicion in the community's eye on how their government was 
operating. Appellant's protest over the over pitching rule is an incident of speech that 
discussed a matter of public concern regarding the safety of the children. In one of the 
games where Appellant's team was involved an opposing team utilized a pitcher beyond the 
allowed number of "outs" for the week. [R. 306]. Appellant raised the issue that the team 
that engaged in doing this should forfeit the game not only because it was a rule but also due 
to safety reasons because some overzealous coaches may sacrifice the long-term asset of a 
boy's pitching arm for the short-sighted goal of the chance of winning a single game. 
Appellant brought this up with Bray, who was present at the game, but Bray disagreed with 
Appellant and said the game should continue. [R. 306]. Bray's decision would have prevailed 
were it not for Steve Shelton overruling Bray's decision. Steve Shelton is the President of 
the Utah Boy's Baseball Association and was present at the said game. Shelton considered 
the rulebook and agreed with Appellant and the game was forfeited. [R. 305]. This over-
pitching rule impacts the health and safety of the children and therefore Appellant's speech 
sufficiendy touches on a matter of public concern. Seejohnsen v. Independent School Dist. No. 3 
of Rule County, 891 F.2d 1485, 57 Ed.L.Rep 1154 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the speech of 
a school nurse against the school district's medication policy potentially impacted children's 
health and therefore was a matter of public concern). 
7 
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Under the second Pickering element, Appellees contend that Lehi City's interest in 
preventing "disruption" of official functions (i.e. the activities sponsored by the Lehi City 
Recreation Department) outweighed Appellant's interest in commenting about the rule 
changes. Appellees argue that under the Rankin v. McPherson analysis, Bray and Harrison had 
a superior interest in avoiding disruption of the Lehi City sports programs. [Brief of 
Appellees, p. 30]. However, many of the statements relied upon by Appellees in support of 
this argument are mere generalizations inferred from the record and are disputed by 
Appellant and other witnesses. Even if these assertions could be substantiated, the question 
remains whether under a summary judgment standard, these assertions are undisputed 
material facts. The inquiry is entirely too fact specific to provide a legal basis upon which to 
grant summary judgment, and Appellant has alleged that the actions taken by Bray and 
Harrison were directly and only a result of Appellant's protesting of the proposed rule 
changes. The revocation of his volunteer position was not to prevent the disruption of Lehi 
City's recreational programs, but to punish Appellant for speaking out. 
Analyzing the third Pickering element, Appellees make a blanket statement that 
Appellant has provided no evidence that Appellees action to remove him as a volunteer 
coach was premised on the content or topic of his speech. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 31-32]. 
Even if Appellant admitted in his deposition that he had become angry with Bray or used 
the term "bull" in his speech, there is ample evidence in Appellant's affidavit and in the 
Amended Verified Complaint that Bray had verbally represented at the end of the 2006 season 
that Appellant would be allowed to coach. [R. 58, 305]. It was not until after Appellant 
expressed his concerns about the 2006 rule changes that Bray took action to compile a list of 
"offending" actions and Harrison informed Appellant of the decision not to select him as 
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coach for the 2007 season. Regardless of Appellees' characterization of the facts, there are 
sufficient facts in dispute to preclude summary judgment on this issue. 
Summary judgment is appropriate "when there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). This Court has stated that, "[I]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we analyze 
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." Arnold v. Grigsby, 2010 UT App 226, f 12, 239 P.3d 294 (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Contrary to these requirements, Appellees have asked this Court to analyze the facts 
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Appellees' 
position. There are numerous disputed facts in this case, and those facts go to the motivations, 
intentions, and reasons for the parties' actions and behaviors in this case. Appellees cannot 
simply rely upon their own version of the story and draw inferences therefrom to support 
their legal contentions for purposes of a summary judgment motion. The trial court erred in 
placing reliance upon Appellees' version of the facts and using those facts to grant summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees and against Appellant. 
B. Appellant acknowledges that his Fourteenth Amendment claim is 
derivative of his First Amendment claim. Appellant has shown by 
admissible evidence that he was treated substantially differently from 
other similarly situated coaches and that there was no alleged rational 
basis for the disparate treatment. 
Appellant agrees that his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim is premised 
on the allegation that he was engage in protected First Amendment speech and that a legal 
bar to his First Amendment claim would effectively bar his equal protection claim. 
Appellant points this Court to the argument contained in his initial Brief (pp. 31-32) 
9 
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in response to Appellees' argument that Appellant has not shown he was intentionally 
treated differently than other similarly situated coached and that there was no rational basis 
for the alleged disparate treatment. 
2. Appellant has asserted an unconstitutional policy or custom and Lehi City did 
violate Appellant's constitutional rights. 
Appellees present two principal arguments in favor of affirming the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment. First, Appellees argue that Appellant did not show that any Lehi City 
employee "acted pursuant to an unlawful official municipal policy or custom. [Brief of 
Appellees, pp. 36-37]. Secondly, Appellant asserts that Lehi City did not violate any of 
Appellant's constitutional rights. [Brief of Appellees, p. 37]. Appellant will address each of 
these arguments in order. 
A, Lehi City employees did act pursuant to an official municipal policy or 
custom. 
According to Appellee, a local government can only be subject to the suit for its 
employees' alleged constitutional violations "if the plaintiff shows that the employees acted 
pursuant to an unlawful official municipal policy or custom." [Brief of Appellees, p. 36]. 
Appellee has mischaracterized the legal standard. In fact, the requirement is that the plaintiff 
show that an employee acted pursuant to a local government's policy or custom and that 
execution of that policy or custom inflicts the injury. See Monellv. Department of Social Services of 
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ("We conclude, 
therefore, that a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely 
by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, 
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to 
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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( 
under § 1983."). In other words, the policy or custom itself may not necessarily be illegal or 
unconstitutional, but execution of that policy or custom by the employee or agent of the 
local government results in a constitutional violation. 
Appellees state that Appellant has not alleged in the Verified Amended Complaint or an 
appeal that Lehi City promulgated an unconstitutional policy or custom and that this failure 
is fatal to his claims against Lehi City. [Brief of Appellees, p. 37]. However, it is clear from 
the record that Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
contains a clear statement concerning the "policy or custom" factor and the facts supporting 
such an allegation. [R. 316-18]. The trial court also briefly addressed this matter in its Ruling. 
[R. 449]. Appellant respectfully points the Court to these documents in assessing the matter 
of the constitutionality of Bray and Harrison in executing Lehi City's policies or customs. 
B. Lehi City's actions were violative of Appellant's constitutional rights. 
Appellees' second argument actually contains several sub-arguments that can be 
summarized as follows: 
(1) Bray and Harrison did not violate Appellant's first amendment rights because 
Appellant's speech does not satisfy the Pickering balance test. Furthermore, 
there is no legal authority to indicate that volunteers (such as Appellant) are 
entitled to equal protection under the law; and even if there was such 
authority, Appellant has not shown that Bray and Harrison treated Appellant 
differently or that there was not a rational basis for such treatment. [Brief of 
Appellees, p. 38]; 
(2) Appellant's due process rights were not violated because "unpaid seasonal 
volunteers" do not enjoy a liberty or due process interest in their volunteer 
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status. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 36-37]; 
(3) Even if due process protected extend to volunteers, Appellant did not possess 
a protected property or liberty interest in his volunteer position because the 
verbal promise that Appellant might be allowed a coaching position in 2007 is 
insufficient to establish that Appellant had a legitimate claim to entitlement of 
a benefit created by an independent state law, rule or understanding. Brief of 
Appellees, pp. 39-41]; 
(4) Appellant does not possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his 
volunteer coaching status and reputation, alone, does not constitute a liberty 
or property interest. [Brief of Appellees, p. 41]; 
(5) Finally, Appellant was afforded all of the process he was due because he was 
allowed to be heard by Lehi City representatives. [Brief of Appellees, p. 42]. 
Appellant has already addressed each of these points in his initial Brief [Brief of 
Appellees, pp. 28-33] and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
\R. 314-19]. Appellant respectfully directs the Court's attention to those portions of the 
aforementioned documents. 
3. Certain statements contained in the Affidavits of Appellant, Bridget Doyle, 
James Johnson, Alan Paul, Joyce Olson, Sharon Johnson, Stanley Crump and 
Roger Dean were improperly struck. 
In his initial Brief, Appellant has explained in detail why certain affidavit statements 
of Appellant and others offered in opposition to Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment 
should #0/have been stricken. [Brief of Appellant, pp. 14-22]. While Appellant is content to 
let this Court review each of the stricken statements from the affidavits and reach a 
determination as to whether the trial court had a sufficient legal basis to strike those 
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statements, Appellant wishes to reiterate the following points with respect to Appellant's 
personal affidavit: 
(1) Appellant's entire affidavit statement was deemed "immaterial" by the trial 
court in the March 23, 2010 Ruling. [R. 452-53]; 
(2) Appellant's affidavit is highly material insofar as it directly rebuts many of the 
Appellees' allegations—allegations that form the basis for the pretext that 
Appellant was terminated as a coach for reasons other than exercising his right 
to speak publicly about the baseball program; 
(3) If the trial court was willing to accept the entirety of the affidavit testimony 
submitted by Appellees in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment as 
material to the legal issues, it should have done the same for Appellant. 
(4) Conversely, if all of the factual matters asserted in Appellant's affidavit 
(matters directly relating to Appellant's behavior, attitude, interactions, 
rationale for objecting to certain procedures, tangible benefits derived from 
coaching, etc.) are "immaterial" to the legal issues, then all of Appellees' 
affidavit statements relating to those same matters should be deemed 
immaterial as well. 
4. This Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Appellees on Appellant's defamation and breach of contract claims because 
Appellant's Amended Notice of Claim was adequate under applicable law. 
In their Brief, Appellees do not take issue with Appellant's analysis of Utah law 
governing the required elements of a notice of claim. [Brief of Appellees, p. 45]. Appellees 
also agree that under relevant case law interpreting the notice of claim requirements, 
Appellant was not required to list his causes of action by name or to meet the standard 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
D gitized by the Howard . r Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generate ay contain errors.
required to state an ordinary claim for relief. [Brief of Appellees, p. 45]. 
Appellees, however, assert that Appellant was required to include enough facts 
pertaining to his defamation and breach of contract claim in order to notify Lehi City that he 
would be pursuing those claims. [Brief of Appellees, p. 45]. According to Appellees, because 
Appellant's Amended Notice of Claim did not contain language that could be associated with 
the concepts of a "contract" or "defamation," Appellant did not provide enough specificity 
to apprise Appellees of the "nature of the claim." [Brief of Appellees, pp. 45-56]. Appellees 
cite to Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 12, % 14, 155 P.3d 900 in support of their 
position. 
In his initial Brief, Appellant analyzes Heideman v. Washington City in conjunction with 
other relevant Utah decisions involving notice of claim issues including Cedar Prof I Pla^a 
L.C v. Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT App 36, 131 P.3d 275, Greene v. Utah Transit Autk, 2001 UT 
109, 37 P.3d 1156, Houghton v. Department of Health 2005 UT 63, 125 P.3d 860, and Peoples v. 
State, 2004 UT App 328, 100 P.3d 254 and (by analogy) Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 
P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). [Brief of Appellant, pp. 36-44]. 
The entire point of Appellant's discussion of these cases is to highlight the conflict 
between Heideman v. Washington City and the other decisions in regards to the quantum of 
specificity or detail required in a notice of claim concerning each potential cause of action, 
and to illustrate the uncertainty that results for a plaintiff in formulating the notice of claim. 
Appellant also outlined the problems with requiring a notice of claim to include every 
possible cause of action (or even facts that could give rise to an unstated cause of action) vis-
a-vis the general rules governing the amending of pleadings and discovery under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. [Brief of Appellant, pp. 44-46]. 
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i 
Appellant reasserts that Appellees are incorrect in stating that Appellant must forfeit 
his defamation and breach of contract claims because such claims (or facts supporting those { 
claims) were not referenced in the Amended Notice of Claim. On the contrary, Appellant's 
general description identifying the broader legal implications of the alleged violations (when 
read in conjunction with the brief statement of facts and a statement of potential damages) 
in the Amended Notice of Claim is sufficient to strictly comply with Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-
401(3)(a)(ii). 
5. Appellant has not appealed the dismissal of his estoppel claim. 
Appellant indicated in his initial Brief that he did not appeal the dismissal of his 
equitable estoppel claim. [Brief of Appellant, p. 36, n. 3]. Therefore, this issue is not before 
the Court 
6. This Court should not affirm summary judgment on Appellant's defamation 
claim because a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that statements written 
by Appellee MacKintosh and circulated by Appellees Harrison and Bray were 
defamatory as a matter of law. 
Appellees propose an alternative basis for affirming the trial court's dismissal of 
Appellant's defamation claim. Because the trial court dismissed Appellant's defamation claim 
on grounds that the Amended Notice of Claim was deficient, it never addressed Appellees' 
argument that Appellant had failed to plead facts sufficient to articulate a defamation claim. 
On appeal, Appellees renew their argument to this Court that the statements made by 
MacKintosh and circulated by Harrison and Bray were not of a sufficiently offensive nature 
to meet the legal standard for defamation. [Brief of Appellees, p. 48]. Appellees argue that 
"no reasonable juror could conclude that the statements alleged are actually defamatory." 
[Brief of Appellees, p. 47]. Appellant disagrees. 
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Appellant's Amended Verified Complaint contains an allegation that MacKintosh made 
at least four written statements concerning Appellant's decorum in front of and interaction 
with children as well as encouraging minor children on his team to "knock kids over." \R. 
49]. Bray and Harrison circulated these statements to the Mayor of Lehi City as well as other 
employees, volunteers and participants in the sports program. [R. 48]. Utah courts have 
consistently held that summary judgment (even where material facts are undisputed) is only 
appropriate where no reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party. See e.g. 
Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, \ 54, 221 P.3d 219; Parduhn v. Bennett, 2002 UT 93,126, 61 
P.3d 982; Ulibarriv. Christenson, 215 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1954). 
A reasonable jury could determine that the statements made by MacKintosh and 
circulated by Bray and Harrison impeached Appellant's reputation and integrity. Certainly, 
for Appellant, such statements were damaging to his standing as a long-term volunteer coach 
in the community and were of an especially harmful nature where his volunteer position was 
concerned. Accordingly, this Court should not affirm as a matter of law on alternative 
grounds that Appellant's articulation of his defamation claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in Appellant's initial Brief, Appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's grant summary judgment in favor of 
Appellees and against Appellant on his claims. 
Submitted this 21st day of March 2011. 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN, 
H E I D E M A N , MCKAY, HEUGLY & OLSEN, L.L.C., 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant William A. Doyle 
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NOTICE CONCERNING ADDENDA 
Appellant notes that no additional addenda are included with this Reply Brief. 
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